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WHOSE LAW IS IT ANYWAY?
THE CULTURAL LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
ELIZABETH M. BRUCH*

"The Court's discussion of these foreign views ... is therefore meaningless
dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this Court ... should not impose
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.'" - Justice Antonio Scalia
(2003). 1
"It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins
to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by
other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality ofthose same rirts
within our own heritage of freedom."- Justice Anthony Kennedy (2005).

"We have our own law, we have our own traditions, we have our own
precedents, and we should look to that in interpreting our Constitution." Justice Samuel Alito (2006). 3
INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the United States and international law is
complex and evolving, implicating political, cultural, and legal considerations.
In the realm of international human rights law, the relationship is particularly
and deeply contested. In recent years, the bounds of that relationship have been
challenged in the national media, in public discourse, and in all three branches

•
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of Law, for his thoughtful comments on an early draft of this article. In addition, I am grateful
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various stages in my writing process, to my colleagues at Valparaiso, and to Chris Johnson for
early discussions and comments on this article. I also appreciate the research and editing
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Finally, I am thankful to Dave Gage for his perspective and encouragement.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster
v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990,990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 578 (2005).
3. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofSamuel A. A/ito, Jr. to be an Associate
Justice ofthe Supreme Court ofthe United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 370 (2006) (statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.corn/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/0 1/1 O/AR20060 II 00078l.html
[hereinafter A/ito Confirmation Hearing].

669

670

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:669

of the federal government. 4 In an era where the public focuses much of its
attention on the appropriate role of the judiciary, a series of United States
Supreme Court decisions that cite to international human rights law have been
controversial. In its 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 5 its 2003 decision in
Lawrence v. Texas, 6 and its 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons/ the Supreme
Court invoked international human rights law and the practice of other nations
in resolving issues of fundamental rights to life and privacy.
The Court's action has drawn both praise and vilification and has invited
serious inquiry into the legitimacy of such a judicial approach. Most scholars
who have undertaken this inquiry have considered the Supreme Court's
conduct from either a perspective of comparative constitutionalism,8 or as a
4. See Charles Lane, The Court is Open for Discussion; AU Students Get Rare Look at
Justices' Legal Sparring, WASH. PosT, Jan. 14, 2005, at AI (recounting the debate between
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen G. Breyer at American University Washington
College of Law over the Supreme Court's use of foreign and international law in its decisions);
Tony Mauro, U.S. Supreme Court vs. The World, USA TODAY, June 20,2005, at 15A, available
at2005 WLNR 9728892 (reviewing the current controversy over the use ofintemationallaw by
the Supreme Court); Abdon M. Pallasch, Justices Shouldn't Cite Foreign Laws, U.S. Attorney
General Tells Students, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at 24, available at2005 WLNR
19361771 (reporting Attorney General Alberto Gonzales's remarks against the citation of
"foreign law" in Supreme Court opinions).
5. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting the execution of the developmentally disabled).
Although the Court used the descriptive term of"mentally retarded," which was the language
used in the earlier proceedings, this Article will instead use the term "developmentally disabled"
to refer to the individuals whose rights are at stake in the decision.
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding a criminal sodomy statute unconstitutional).
7. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders).
8. A comparative constitutionalist perspective considers the Supreme Court's citations to
foreign and international sources principally in determining when, if at all, it is appropriate for a
domestic court interpreting its national constitution to look to sources outside that constitution
framework. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tibunals, and the
Continuum ofDeference: A Postscript on Lawrence v. Texas, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 913, 926-28
(2004); Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, 131 PoL'Y REv. 33, 34
(June - July 2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., United States: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Imperative of Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 lNT'LJ. CONST. L. 555, 556 (2004); Eric A.
Posner, Transnational Legal Process and the Supreme Court's 2003-2004 Term: Some
Skeptical Observations, 12 TuLSAJ. COMP. & lNT'L L. 23, 25,36-37 (2004); John Yoo, Peeking
Abroad?: The Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 26 U.
HAw. L. REv. 385, 393 (2004). Scholars distinguish between "soft" and "hard" use of foreign
and international legal sources, including empirical use (evidence), reason-borrowing,
normative use (moral-factfinding), and use as a matter of comity. Taavi Annus, Comparative
Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and Strategy ofSelecting the Right Arguments, 14 DuKEJ.
COMP. & INT'L L. 301, 312 (2004) (describing as "soft" the use of foreign materials without
relying on them in reaching the holding and "hard" use as the direct contribution ofcomparative
materials in the holding either through normative reasoning or empirical reasoning). Some
scholars are critical of all uses, others of "hard" uses. /d.; see also Alford, supra, at 926-27
(using the "continuum of deference" model, which is used to distinguish between the varying
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matter of the domestic implementation of international law. 9 As an alternative
to those perspectives, this Article examines the national controversy over the
Supreme Court's decisions in Atkins, Lawrence, and Simmons through the lens
of international human rights law. When states undertake international human
rights obligations, they become responsible for ensuring compliance with those
obligations within their domestic legal orders. 10 This state responsibility
includes punishing violations of human rights, as well as respecting and
ensuring the free exercise of those rights. 11 Governments are expected to take
degrees of deference to foreign materials, and generally opposing U.S. deference to these
materials); Eskridge, supra, at 556-59 (approving use of foreign materials as indicative of an
"emerging normative consensus," as a matter of"international comity," and as a recognition of
"pluralism"); Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization":
Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic
Constitutional Interpretation, 65 Omo ST. L.J. 1283, 1298 (2004) (criticizing domestic use of
foreign materials unless there is adequate justification for its use); Yoo, supra, at 393 (opposing
U.S. deference to foreign materials generally).
9. The main issue from this perspective is whether international law has become binding
at the domestic level; of course, this would never be an issue regarding foreign law sources.
See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, "Raise the Flag and Let It Talk": On the Use of External
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 2 INTL. J. CONST. L. 597, 608-09 (2004).
10. The major human rights treaties contain general language of obligation to this effect.
For example, Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
I. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in
the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the
possibilities ofjudicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 2, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. N6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR].
II. /d.; see also Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No.4, atmf
164-65 (July 29, 1988) (The obligation of states to ensure free and full exercise of human rights
"implies the duty of States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all
the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable ofjuridically
ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights.").
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the lead in creating domestic conditions that foster fulfillment of their
international human rights obligations. The relative ease or difficulty of this
implementation process depends largely on the degree to which the
international standards comport with existing domestic values. 12
Although the United States has often taken the lead globally in advancing
international human rights, it has been notoriously reluctant to ratify
international human rights agreements or to incorporate those agreements into
domestic law. 13 Some of this reluctance has stemmed from a U.S. perception
that domestic law already provides significant protection for individual rights. 14
This sense of international leadership and dominance persists in the current
resistance to international law, but it has been increasingly overshadowed by
concerns grounded in the converse notion of isolation and fear that other
nations are now mandating standards for the United States. 15 Despite frequent
12. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, I 06 YALEL.J. 2599,
2645-46 ( 1997) (discussing the theory that internalized compliance and obedience will increase
comportment with international law); see Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, State Responsibility Under
International Human Rights Law to Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OF WOMEN 167, 169 (Rebecca J. Cooked., 1994) [hereinafter An-Na'im, State Responsibility]
("In practice, a state's willingness or ability to influence practices based on religious and
customary laws depends on many factors, any of which could cause difficulty in situations
where domestic religious and customary laws are likely to be in conflict with internationally
recognized standards ofhuman rights.").
13. The current Bush administration is well-known not only for its reluctance to undertake
international obligations but also for its willingness to disavow them. See Neil A. Lewis, U.S.
Rejects All Support for New Court on Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, atAII, available at
2002 WLNR 4088405 (documenting the Bush administration's ''unsigning" ofthe International
Criminal Court treaty, originally signed by President Clinton); U.S. Won't Follow Climate
Treaty Provisions, Whitman Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at A19 (reporting that the Bush
administration would not support the Kyoto international climate treaty). While previous
administrations have been more willing to undertake international obligations, they frequently
placed conditions on those obligations or faced resistance from Congress. See Connie de Ia
Vega, Human Rights and Trade: Inconsistent Application ofTreaty Law in the United States, 9
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. I, 11-13 (2004) (criticizing the United States' history of
conditional ratification); David Sloss, The Domestication ofInternational Human Rights: NonSelf-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. lNT'L L. 129, 139-42
(1999) (describing the history of ratification ofhuman rights treaties in the United States).
14. See, e.g., Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Round Table Discussion on International Human
Rights Standards in the United States: The Case ofReligion or Belief, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REv.
973, 977 (1998) [hereinafter An-Na'im, Round Table Discussion]. The remarks of participant
Jeremy Gunn illustrate this idea: "[A]Ithough the United States does not apply the international
standards to itself: it nevertheless-with important exceptions-generally acts in accordance
with international standards and often exceeds them." /d. Another participant, David
Bederman, echoed this perception of a "culture of compliance" but noted the risks ofthe United
States' sense of constitutional exceptionalism. !d. at 982.
15. See supra note 4; see also Phyllis Schlafly, Is Relying on Foreign Law an
Impeachable
Offense?,
EAGLE
FORUM,
Mar.
16,
2005,
http://www.eagleforum.org/column/2005/mar05/05-03-16.html (expressing outrage that the
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claims of"American exceptionalism," the United States is currently engaging
in the same struggle that other nations undergo in the process of reconciling
international legal standards and obligations with domestic cultural values and
policy concerns. The United States Supreme Court has been, and continues to
be, an important part of that process by playing an appropriate, though limited,
role in advancing the cultural legitimacy of international human rights in the
United States.
The national controversy about the Supreme Court's decisions has been
misguided in several respects that merit brief clarification. As an initial point,
the public discourse on the issue regularly, and incorrectly, conflates
international law 16 with "foreign law," which is the domestic law of other
nations. 17 Moreover, the use of these collective "foreign" sources is often
characterized in a way that suggests that the Court has treated the sources as
binding or otherwise authoritative. 18 In reality, the Supreme Court has cited
foreign law 19 and internationallaw20 in its decisions, but the Court has never
Supreme Court used foreign law and international opinion in its Simmons decision).
16. Three sources comprise international law: treaties, customary law, and general
principles oflaw. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§
102 (1987). For example, in Roper v. Simmons, when the Supreme Court cited to the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Court called it an international authority.
543 U.S. 551, 575-76 (2005). When the United States is party to a treaty, that treaty is binding
on the United States as an international legal obligation. REsTATEMENT, supra,§ Ill. The
treaty is enforceable in U.S. courts if it is self-executing or if it has been implemented by
domestic legislation. /d. Customary international law is generally binding on all states. /d. §§
701-02.
17. Foreign law sources would include the laws of other countries or the decisions oftheir
national courts. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court cites foreign law when it cites to
the criminal legislation ofthe United Kingdom. 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003). In conflating the
two, many have referred to both international law and foreign law as "foreign" sources, with the
pejorative connotations of that term. See, e.g., infra Part II. C. Foreign law, of course, would
not be binding on a U.S. court (although parties to litigation in a U.S. court may be bound in
some circumstances by foreign law).
18. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to be ChiefJustice
of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, I 09th Cong. 293 (2005),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/14/AR200509140 1445.html [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation
Hearing] (Question by Senator Coburn: "My question to you is, relying on foreign precedent
and selecting and choosing a foreign precedent to create a bias outside of the laws of this
country, is that good behavior?" (emphasis added)); see also A/ito Confirmation Hearing, supra
note 3, at 370 (Question by Senator Kyl: "What is the proper role, in your view, of foreign law
in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and when, if ever, is citation to or reliance on these foreign
laws appropriate?" (emphasis added)).
19. For example, in Lawrence, the Court cited to British law repealing the criminal laws
punishing homosexual conduct. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73 (citing the United Kingdom's
Sexual Offences Act 1967, c. 60 § 1). Similarly, in Simmons, the Court cited British laws
prohibiting the execution of juveniles. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 577 (citing the Children and
Young Person's Act, 1933,23 Geo. 5, c. 12 (U.K.), and the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, II & 12
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suggested that the foreign or international law sources it cited were binding. 21
The Atkins, Lawrence, and Simmons decisions are firmly grounded in domestic
U.S. law. 22
So why is there a controversy at all? In the current international legal
system, the formation and development of international law, including
international human rights law, occurs primarily at the international level
through the creation of bilateral and multilateral treaties and through
interpretive mechanisms such as treaty-bodies and international tribunals. In
contrast, the implementation of international human rights law is primarily
entrusted to the national or domestic front. 23 Through their governments,
nation-states are the primary actors in developing and implementin:fi
international human rights law at both the international and national levels.
Geo. 6, c. 58 (U.K.)).
20. The Court cited numerous international human rights treaties in Simmons-including
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 576. In Lawrence, the Court cited a
decision of the European Court of Human Rights. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citing Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R., 52 (1981)).
21. In its decisions, the Court has often taken pains to emphasize this. See infra Part II.
22. See discussion of decisions infra Parts Il.B-C.
23. The international mechanisms to monitor states' compliance with international human
rights obligations include both "treaty bodies," such as the Human Rights Committee (created to
monitor compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), and nontreaty bodies, such as the Human Rights Commission, now the Human Rights Council (a
subsidiary body of the United Nations to monitor general compliance with international human
rights obligations). But these international mechanisms are generally considered to be avenues
of last resort. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 4l(c) (requiring exhaustion of all
available domestic remedies before the Committee will consider a matter); see also Joan
Fitzpatrick, The Role ofDomestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, in
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 247, 261-62 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed.
1999) (describing the primacy of national mechanisms in protecting human rights). There is a
presumption in favor of resolving problems at the national level, relying on national
governments to set up their domestic systems to protect human rights, provide remedies for
violations, and generally implement international human rights obligations. The primary role of
the international mechanisms is to establish and develop normative standards.
24. International human rights law is essentially a modem, post-World War II
phenomen.)n. Richard B. Bilder, An Overview ofInternational Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 23, at 3, 4-5. The United States and the
other victorious Allied Nations played a foundational role in the development of both the
substantive components of international human rights law and the international monitoring
mechanisms. I d. United States historians note the important role played by Eleanor Roosevelt
and others in developing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the foundational human
rights document, which was later "codified" into the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See
John P. Humphrey, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 31-33, 4243 ( 1984); John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights: Its History, Impact
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Nonetheless, there is often popular concern that international human rights law
at the domestic level represents the view of outsiders "imposed" on the nation,
and that its domestic use offends national sovereignty and is sure to be out of
step with domestic views and values. In the United States, this concern
manifests itself in a wide range of contexts: from the popularity of"Get the US
25
out of the UN" bumper stickers, or the dismissive presidential rhetoric and
26
decision-making, to the proposed Congressional "Reaffirmation of American
27
Independence Resolution." Most immediately, concerns about international
law are threaded throughout the current controversy over the role of the
judiciary and the concern that "activist judges" will influence or change
28
domestic law in ways that are contrary to domestic values.
Concerns about judicial activism and the imposition of"foreign" values are
not unique to the United States or to the area of international human rights
29
law; they commonly appear in the human rights arena as an aspect of the
and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS:

•

THIRTY YEARS AFTER

UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION 21-37 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979). Nonetheless, many legal, philosophical,
religious, and moral systems find support for the underlying principles of fundament3:l human
rights in their own traditions and historical roots. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights pmbl., June 27, 1981, 211.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter].
25. See, e.g., Cafepress.com, US out of UN - UN out of US!,
http://www.cafepress.com/unwelcome (last visited Jan. 12, 2007); see also GetUSout.org, Get
US out! of the United Nations, http://www.getusout.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (describing
the campaign of the John Birch Society to get the United States out of the United Nations).
26. The current administration has frequently expressed dissatisfaction and frustration
with the United Nations. Many view the recent appointment of John Bolton as the U.S.
Representative to the United Nations as a further indication of this dissatisfaction. Bolton is
notorious for his anti-U.N. comments; Bolton has stated that "if 10 floors of the 38-story U.N.
headquarters building were eliminated, 'it wouldn't make a bit of difference."' Charles
Babington & Dafna Linzer, Bolton Assures Senators ofCommitment to U.N., WASH. PosT, Apr.
12, 2005, at A1, A10. Bolton has also stated, "There is no United Nations. There is an
international community that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the worldthat's the United States when it suits our interests and when we can get others to go along."
Editorial, Questioning Mr. Bolton, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at A18; see also Christian
Bourge, Analysis: Bolton Controls Rhetoric, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Apr. 11, 2005 ("Bolton has a
long history of criticizing multinational institutions, and the United Nations in particular .... ").
27. The Resolution, proposed by U.S. Rep. Feeney and others, states:
That it is the sense of the House ofRepresentatives that judicial interpretations regarding
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States should not be based in whole or in
part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign
judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original meaning of
the Constitution of the United States.
H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005).
28. A lito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 3, at 410 (statement of Senator Sessions: "We
believe that there has been a liberal social agenda being promoted too often by the courts that is
foreign to our history and contrary to the wishes of the American people."); see supra notes 4,
15.
29. For example, in the negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement, state
THE
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debate between universalism and cultural relativism. Most international human
rights advocates, and many of the human rights instruments themselves, assert
the universality of human rights standards. 30 Skeptics often reject these
sweeping claims in the name of "culture" and cultural relativism; similar
arguments have been raised by governments that seek to avoid international
human rights obligations/' and increasingly by a wide spectrum of activists,
policymakers, and scholars who challenge the hegemony of the "western" view
of international human rights. 32 In its relatively brief history, international
and national authorities were concerned about submitting to a "supranational" authority. See
Stephen Zamora, Allocating Legislative Competence in the Americas: The Early Experience
Under NAFTA and the Challenge ofHemispheric Integration, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 615, 633
(1997).
30. "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and ofthe equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world ..
. ."Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; "Considering the
obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and freedoms ...." International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]. This claim of universality is
derived from the very nature of human rights, which are premised on a common, shared
humanity and recognition of entitlement to basic human dignity that is equally available to all,
regardless of distinctions such as race, gender, religion, and other fundamental characteristics.
In 1993, the principle of universality was explicitly re-embraced at the United Nations World
Conference on Human Rights:
The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the solemn commitment ofall States to
fulfil [sic] their obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance and protection
of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights, and international law. The
universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question.
World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, 1[ I.l, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.l57/23 (July 12, 1993).
31 . See Michael C. Davis, Human Rights in Asia: China and the Bangkok Declaration, 2
BUFF. J. INT'L L. 215, 226-27 (1996) (quoting a speech by Liu Huaqiu, Head of the Chinese
Delegation to the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, criticizing infringements on
sovereignty in the name of universal human rights).
32. The international community and its mechanisms are generally criticized for being
dominated by western, developed nations, and further criticized because the membership of
international bodies is overwhelmingly male, even when there is a broader geographical and
racial distribution. See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Problems of Universal Cultural
Legitimacy for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES
331, 348-53 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990) [hereinafter AnNa'im, Problems] (discussing the exclusion of non-western participants and perspectives in the
early development of the international human rights regime); HILARY CHARLESWORTH &
CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 36-37,
174-79 (2000) (identifying a "Southern" critique of the "Western origins, orientation and
cultural bias" of the international legal order and noting that both the U.N. membership and its
bureaucracy are dominated by men).
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human rights law has attracted legitimate criticisms from those who were left
out of the process of developing the international standards that they are now
expected to embrace. Noted human rights scholar Abdullahi A. An-Na'im
offers two main critiques: first, that the normative development of international
human rights law has been limited by the dominant influence of the "cultures"
that developed it; and second, that the real and perceived absence of cultural
legitimacy at the domestic level has hindered implementation of international
human rights law. 33 These are, of course, related points because the more
international human rights law reflects accepted domestic cultural values, the
greater the likelihood of successful implementation of those laws at the
domestic level. 34
An-Na'im has considered the importance of domestic cultural legitimacy
for the successful implementation of international human rights standards
primarily in areas of perceived conflict between human rights and Islam. 35 He
33. See An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 171 (noting that the argument
against universal cultural legitimacy of human rights on the ground that "the basic conception
and major principles . .. emerged from western philosophical and political developments" may
be true in light offactors such as "the nature and context of the drafting process, the limitations
of studies purporting to cover a variety of cultural perspectives on the subject and the quality of
representation of non-western points of view"); see also An-Na'im, Problems, supra note 32, at
331 (noting that discrepancies between theory and practice in the human rights arena results
from ineffective enforcement of procedures).
34. Others have also considered the role of cultural legitimacy as it relates to increasing
compliance with international law. See Koh, supra note 12, at 2600-02. Koh identifies the
process as Transnational Legal Process (TLP), which "promotes the interaction, interpretation,
and internalization of international legal norms." /d. at 2603. Koh distinguishes social,
political, and legal internalization of norms, including explicit and implicit judicial
internalization. /d. at 2656-57. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks also discuss coercion,
persuasion, and acculturation as methods for ensuring compliance with international human
rights law. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 623 (2004). But others are more reluctant
to endorse "internalization" of international norms. See Posner, supra note 8, at 34-36
(criticizing TLP on five grounds: "international law is not always good"; ')udges are not always
going to act the way we want them to"; ')udges just don't know much about foreign policy,
foreign countries, and foreign law"; "courts are, by design, passive and reactive"; and "TLP is
undemocratic"). These themes are echoed in some ofthe dissenting opinions discussed infra.
35. In his article, State Responsibility Under International Human Rights Law to Change
Religious and Customary Laws, An-Na'im uses his proposed framework to discuss changing or
reinterpreting Islamic religious laws to better advance the human rights of women. An-Na'im,
State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 181-84; see also Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Islam and
Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate, 94 ASIL PROC. 95, 99-100 (2000) (discussing
religion and human rights in Mauritius); Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, The Contingent Universality
of Human Rights: The Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, 11
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 29, 54-64 ( 1997) (discussing freedom of expression in Kenya and Sudan);
Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, The Rights ofWomen and International Law in the Muslim Context, 9
WHlTTIERL. REv. 491,491-97 (1987) [hereinafter An-Na'im,RightsofWomen] (discussing the
rights of women under Shari'a law).
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proposes a simple conceptual framework to evaluate and refine international
human rights law and theory, both in terms of its future development and the
success of efforts to implement it at the national level. 36 Under this framework,
internal discourse plays a central role in developing the needed cultural
legitimacy for human rights norms in the domestic arena, and cross-cultural
dialogue offers a supporting role to external views in that process. 37
This Article uses Professor An-Na'irn's "internal discourse- cross-cultural
dialogue" theoretical framework to describe and evaluate the current debate in
the United States over the use of international human rights standards
domestically. 38 Part I of this Article describes An-Na'irn's model for
evaluating and advancing the cultural legitimacy of human rights in domestic
contexts. It briefly addresses the critique that current international human
rights norms reflect historical and existing power relationships in the
international community. But it focuses on the interplay of internal discourse
and cross-cultural dialogue in the domestic implementation of those norms.
Part II scrutinizes the current debate about the role of international human
rights law in United States courts through this internal discourse - crosscultural dialogue structure as part of the process of increasing the cultural
legitimacy of human rights in the United States. This Part considers the recent
Supreme Court decisions in Atkins, Simmons, and Lawrence that implicate both
domestic constitutional law and, arguably, international human rights law: the
prohibition of the death penalty for the developmentally disabled and for
juveniles39 and the affirmation of the freedom of individuals to engage in
private sexual behavior.40 This Part also briefly addresses the implications of
36. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 167-69; see also An-Na'im,
Problems, supra note 32, at 331 (discussing discrepancies between law and practice in the
human right arena, despite the existence of elaborate standards). He urges testing and use ofhis
framework in other domestic contexts, as well. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12,
at 184-85.
37. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 174.
38. An-Na'im himself has been involved in examining the right to freedom of religion in
the United States and is beginning to consider questions of cultural legitimacy of human rights
in the United States. See An-Na'im, Round Table Discussion, supra note 14, at 975 (presenting
the proceedings of a conference on religious liberty in the United States and including remarks
by An-Na'im). This Article does not focus on the issue of religious rights but will draw upon
some of the general insights offered by conference participants regarding United States culture
and the domestic approach to human rights.
39. Part II.A. considers the recent Supreme Court decisions in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002) (prohibiting the execution of the mentally disabled) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005) (prohibiting the execution of juveniles). The death penalty raises domestic
constitutional concerns under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual
punishment" and international human rights concerns under conventional and customary
protection of the right to life and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment.
40. Part II.B. considers the recent Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (finding a Texas statute criminalizing certain sexual behavior between same-sex
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the recent changes to the Supreme Court membership. 41 The Article concludes
that both the Supreme Court's consideration of international and comparative
law and the resulting controversy are appropriate aspects of the ongoing
development of domestic law in accordance with international standards.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC CULTURAL LEGITIMACY FOR
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND LAWS

Understanding the process, and often the struggle, to develop cultural
legitimacy for human rights standards at the domestic level requires an
understanding of the recurring critiques of international human rights law,
notably./: that it is not truly "universal" and does not reflect widely shared
2
values. It is within this context that the framework developed by An'Na-im,
with its emphasis on internal discourse and the supplementary role of crosscultural dialogue,43 takes on greater explanatory value and practical
significance.

A. Is "International" the Same as "Universal "? An Overarching Critique
of the Legitimacy ofInternational Human Rights.
The United States was instrumental in the development of the modem
international human rights movement. 44 To much of the world, the United
partners unconstitutional). The treatment of same-sex intimate relationships and conduct raises
domestic constitutional concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "liberty"
interests and international human rights concerns under conventional and customary protection
of the right to privacy and freedom from discrimination.
41. Part II.C. discusses the confirmation hearings of new Chief Justice John Roberts and
new Justice Samuel Alito and the views they expressed regarding the use of international and
foreign law in Supreme Court decisions.
42. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
43 . An-Na' im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 174.
44. Former United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt coined the name "United
Nations," which was first used in the "Declaration by United Nations" of January 1, 1942.
United Nations, History of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/aboutun/unhistory (last
visited Jan. 12, 2007). "In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the
United Nations Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations
Charter." !d. Former United States President Harry S. Truman stated:
My conviction that we had to have a world organization was so deep that I felt that no
event, no matter how sad and unfortunate, should interfere with the drafting ofthe Charter
of the United Nations. I felt that there was nothing I could do which would be more fitting
to the memory of President Roosevelt than to go ahead with the conference.
Former President Harry S. Truman, Address at the Opera House 273 (June 24, 1955),
www.un.org/depts/dhllanniversary/stsg6j.pdf. "There have been women who have clearly left
their mark on the history of the United Nations. Above all, there was Eleanor Roosevelt, who is
linked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Akmaral Arystanbekova, Diplomacy:
Too Important to be Left to Men?, 39 UN CHRON. 62, 62 (Sept.-Nov. 2002), available at
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Nations and the current international human rights legal regime profoundly
reflect the values and priorities of the United States and other "western"
democracies. 45 International and domestic human rights advocates often
struggle with incorporating these "universal" values, which are frequently
viewed as not universal at all, into particular domestic contexts. As a starting
point, An-N a' im affirms the general importance of international human rights;
yet he acknowledges the criticisms regarding the cultural bias inherent in the
current system. 46 This cultural bias comprises both procedural and substantive
strands: first, the failure to include other ("non-western") perspectives in the
process of developing the initial human rights standards and system of

http://www. un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2002/issue3/0302p62_ first__person.html. Mrs. Roosevelt also
served as Chairperson of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights from 1946 through
1951.
Chairpersons of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/chr/docs/FormerChairpersons.doc (last visited Jan. 12,
2007); see also An-Na'im, Problems, supra note 32, at 348-53 (discussing the exclusion of nonwestern participants and perspectives in the early era of the United Nations).
45. One critical perspective on human rights is that "human rights as propounded in the
west are founded on individualism and therefore have no relevance to Asia which is based on
the primacy of the community." Yash Ghai, The Asian Perspective on Human Rights (1993),
www.hrsolidarity.net/mainfile.php/1993vol05no03/20611 (1993).
"Some Asian' [sic]
governments consider that the western pressure on them for an improvement in human rights is
connected with the project of western global hegemony," which is to be achieved "partly
through the universalisation of western values and aspirations, and partly through the
disorientation of Asian state and political systems." /d. The Chinese government has stated that
"despite its international aspect, the issue of human rights falls by and large within the
sovereignty of each state." /d. The Bangkok Governmental Declaration recognizes "that while
human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and
evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance ofnational and
regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds." /d.; see also
Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor ofHuman Rights, 42 HARV.lNT'L
L.J. 20 I, 210 (200 I) ("[H]uman rights, and the relentless campaign to universalize them,
present a historical continuum in an unbroken chain of Western conceptual and cultural
dominance over the past several centuries.").
46. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 172 (noting that there is already
"significant consensus" on international human rights and that they do provide some "level of
protection"). An-Na'im continues:
It is neither possible, nor desirable in my view, for an international system ofhuman rights
standards to be culturally neutral. However, the claim of such an international system to
universal cultural legitimacy can only be based on a moral and political "overlapping
consensus" among the major cultural traditions of the world. In order to engage all
cultural traditions in the process of promoting and sustaining such global consensus, the
relationship between local culture and international human rights standards should be
perceived as a genuinely reciprocal global collaborative effort.
/d. at 173.
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protection;47 and second, the "western" philosophical and theoretical origins of
the current standards and system.48 An-Na'im explains:
Most African and Asian countries did not participate in the formulation of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights because, as victims of colonization,
they were not members of the United Nations. When they did participate in
the formulation of subsequent instruments, they did so on the basis of an
established framework and philosophical assumptions adopted in their
absence. For example, the pre-existing framework and assumptions favored
individual civil and political rights over collective solidarity rights, such as a
right to development, an outcome which remains problematic today. Some
authors have gone so far as to argue that inherent differences exist between
the Western notion of human rights as reflected in the international
instruments and non-Western notions of human dignity. In the Muslim world,
for instance, there are obvious conflicts between Shari'a and certain human
49
rights, especially of women and non-Muslims.

Many have questioned the notion of an exclusive "western" provenance to
the ideas and values underpinning human rights standards. 50 But there is
validity to critiquing the process's lack of inclusiveness, which involved a
limited number of actors, most of whom were operating from a western
perspective.
The United States presents different challenges to the cultural legitimacy of
international human rights norms, in light of its different history in the
international community. The United States has a history of inclusion, and
even dominance, rather than exclusion. In its foreign policy, the United States
implicitly and often explicitly expects other nations to conform their domestic
51
practices to international law, including international human rights law.
47. An-Na'im, Problems, supra note 32, at 346-53.
48. !d. at 346; An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 171.
49. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World, in THE PHILOSOPHY
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 315, 317 (Patrick Hayden ed., 2001 ).
50. See Catherine Powell, Introduction: Locating Culture, Identity, and Human Rights,
30 CoLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 201,204-05 (1999) (discussing human rights principles as they
relate to the traditions and philosophies of diverse non-western cultures (citing PAUL GoRDON
LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 9-11 (1998))); see
also Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 14 & 21, 1997, at
33, 40 ("Our ideas of political and personal rights have taken their particular form relatively
recently, and it is hard to see them as 'traditional' commitments of Western cultures....
[A]ntecedents can be found plentifully in Asian cultures as well as Western cultures.").
51. For example, "no [foreign] assistance maybe provided ... to the government of any
country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." 22
U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (2000). In addition, "none of the funds made available to carry out this
chapter, and none of the local currencies generated under this chapter, shall be used to provide
training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law
enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program." 22 U.S.C. § 2420(a). The
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United States civic, religious, and other non-governmental organizations do the
same. 52 Nonetheless, the United States shares with many other nations the
phenomenon of resisting outside views on how its domestic laws should
operate. 53 In contrast to the Islamic nations of Africa and the Middle East, the
United States played a significant role in the creation of the United Nations
system and the International Bill of Rights; therefore, both should reflect values
derived from and compatible with U.S. culture. 54 But many in the United
States perceive that this is not the case. Thus, the acceptance of international

Secretary or the Administrator "shall not enter into any agreement under this chapter to provide
agricultural commodities, or to finance the sale of agricultural commodities, to the government
of any country determined by the President to engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations
ofinternationally recognized human rights." 7 U.S.C. § 17330)( I). The United States has also
applied human rights to grounds of inadmissibility. "Any alien who, while serving as a foreign
government official, was responsible for or directly carried out, at any time, particularly severe
violations of religious freedom, as defined in section 3 of the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6402), is inadmissible." Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 5502, 118 Stat. 3740, 3741 (2004).
52. Regarding Nigeria's adoption of the Shari'a, Human Rights Watch has stated,
"Whatever personal beliefs may prevail in different social and religious circles in Nigeria, the
Nigerian government-both at federal and state level-remains bound by international
obligations and conventions." Human Rights Watch, Failure to Conform to International
Human Rights Standards (Sept. 2004), www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0904/l5.htm. "The
UDHR is widely recognized as customary international law. It is a basic yardstick to measure
any country's human rights performance. Unfortunately, Cuba does not measure up." Human
Cuba's
Repressive
Machinery
(1999),
Rights
Watch,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/cuba/Cuba996-0l.htm. "Cuban courts continue to try and
imprison human rights activists, independent journalists, economists, doctors, and others for the
peaceful expression of their views, subjecting them to the Cuban prison system's extremely poor
conditions." !d. "While Cuba's domestic legislation includes broad statements of fundamental
rights, other provisions grant the state extraordinary authority to penalize individuals who
attempt to enjoy their rights to free expression, opinion, press, association, and assembly." !d.
It has been recommended that "[t]he Cuban government should cease all prosecutions based on
the individual' s exercise of fundamental rights to free expression, association, and movement,"
and that "[t]he Cuban government should reform its Criminal Code, repealing or narrowing the
definition of all crimes that are in violation of established international human rights norms and
practices." !d.
53. See supra notes 4, 15.
54. This should particularly be true with regard to civil and political rights. For example,
the Declaration of Independence famously states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights echoes this
language in its Preamble ("Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world[.]"), in Article I ("All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights."), and Article 3 ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person."), and
in other provisions. UDHR, supra note 30, at 71-72.
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human rights norms relies not solely on the nation's involvement in the historic
and ongoing development of those norms at the international level, but also on
the domestic process of acceptance and implementation.

B. Grounding the "Universal" in a Specific Cultural Context: Process and
Bottom-Line Results.
Ultimately, the current international system must operate as a starting point
for any analysis or proposed change. The existing human rights regime has
many strengths, including the simple facts of its existence and endurance as a
legal and political framework. 55 After more than sixty years of history, most
participants and observers agree that certain shared fundamental values do
exist, such as the prohibitions of genocide, slavery, torture, and systematic
discrimination. 56 Now, the focus of critical reform efforts should be on
increasing the legitimacy, effectiveness, and inclusiveness of the existing
human rights legal regime:
Since we already have an international system of human rights law and
institutions, the process should seek to legitimize and anchor the norms of this
established system within, and between, the various cultural traditions of the
55. One of the basic purposes of the United Nations since its founding in 1945 has
included the protection of internationally recognized human rights. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
In 1946, the United Nations General Assembly established a Commission on Human Rights,
and in 1948 it adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United Nations and its
member states are currently engaged in efforts to reform the United Nation's existing human
rights mechanisms by creating a new Human Rights Council. See Warren Hoge, With Its
Human Rights Oversight Under Fire, U.N. Submits a Plan for a Strengthened Agency, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at A6, available at 2006 WLNR 1901893.
56. These are considered jus cogens norms, part of binding, customary and conventional
internationa11aw. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 ( 1987). See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N.
Doc. N39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) (establishing that torture is never justified under any
circumstance); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/ 180, at 193, U.N . GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. N34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979)
[hereinafter CEDAW] (promoting equal rights and condemning any distinction based on sex);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res.
2106A, at 47, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. N6014 (Dec. 21 , 1965) (recognizing that
racial discrimination is repugnant to human society); Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A, at 174, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N.
Doc. N810 (Dec. 9, 1948) (confirming that genocide is a crime under international law);
International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat.
2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/flsc.htm (affirming
the intent to abolish slavery in all its forms throughout the world). An-Na'im uses the shared
fundamental principles of nondiscrimination and legal equality in his work on increasing human
rights protections for women and non-Muslims under Shari' a law. See, e.g., An-Na'im, State
Responsibility, supra note 12, at 181-82; An-Na'im, Rights of Women, supra note 35, at 502.
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world. In other words, the norms of the international system should be
validated in terms of the values and institutions of each culture, and also in
terms of shared or similar values and institutions of all cultures. This can be
achieved, I suggest, through what I call "internal discourse" within the
framework of each culture, and "cross-cultural dialogue" among the various
cultural traditions of the world. 57

"Internal discourse," defined as the discussion and debate on the
application and implementation of human rights at the domestic level, is
important in several respects. Internal discourse must serve as the prim~
mechanism for advancing the cultural legitimacy of human rights norms. 8
Human rights are presumed to be protected initially and primarily at the
domestic level. 59 Additionally, internal discourse is important as a means to
educate and socialize, which aids in developing both consensus and credibility
for the standards adopted. 60 Internal discourse serves as a global equalizer of
sorts, a manifestation of the reciprocal nature of the process. A nation with a
visible internal process draws attention to its treatment of human rights issues,
and also serves as a model for other nations. 61 At the same time, this visible

57. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 174. An-Na'im does not necessarily
endorse the desirability of all existing human rights norms but instead is interested in using
them as a starting point for further development.
58. See id. at 169 (given "the nature ofinternationallaw in general, and its dependence on
largely voluntary compliance and cooperation of sovereign states in the field of human rights in
particular," it is necessary to seek greater consensus in the domestic cultural context).
Accordingly, decisions about how to challenge particular domestic laws should be left to the
process of internal discourse.
59. See supra note 24.
60. See An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 174, 178-79. Addressing this
issue in the context of reconciling international human rights with customary and religious laws
in Muslim countries, An-Na'im explains:
[I]t is clear that the only viable and acceptable way of changing religious and customary
laws is by transforming popular beliefs and attitudes, and thereby changing common
practice. This can be done through a comprehensive and intensive program offormal and
informal education, supported by social services and other administrative measures, in
order to change people's attitudes about the necessity or desirability of continuing a
particular religious or customary practice. To achieve its objective, the program must not
only discredit the religious or customary law or practice in question, but also provide a
viable and legitimate alternative view ofthe matter.
!d. at 178.
61. An-Na'im provides two main rationales for the importance of internal discourse:
First, internal validation is necessary in all cultural traditions for one aspect or another of
the present international human rights system. . . . Second, for such discourse within one
culture to be viable and effective, its participants should be able to point to similar
discourse which is going on in the context of other cultures.
!d. at 174.
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internal process underscores the notion that no nation is immune from having to
adjust its national system to comport with international obligations. 62
The mechanism of cross-cultural dialogue functions as a significant
counterpart and supplement to internal discourse. 63 External actors may
directly encourage dialogue in numerous ways, such as "international action to
protect the freedoms of speech and assembly of internal actors . . . and
assistance in developing and implementing campaign strategies.'M Crosscultural dialogue may also involve strategic use of external resources, such as
the laws and practices of different nations or "the exchange of insights and
experiences about the concept of the particular human ~ht and the
sociopolitical context of its implementation" by internal actors. 6 In addition,
reciprocity plays a role in increasing acceptance of cross-cultural input and in
establishing basic thresholds for compliance with human rights standards. 66
But cross-cultural dialogue must function primarily as a supplement to internal
discourse. There is always a risk that if external actors take an overly active
role in the internal process of reinterpreting cultural norms, their involvement
may be counter-productive and may even alienate those generally supportive of
human rights norms. 67 Again, this is particularly true in areas that are
suspicious of "western" influence based on a history of colonialism and
religious conflict. 68

62. See id. (explaining that internal validation "might be necessary for civil and political
rights in one culture, economic and social rights in another, the rights ofwomen or minorities in
a third, and so forth").
63. See id. An-Na'im offers two main rationales regarding the importance of crosscultural dialogue:
First, from a methodological point of view, all participants in their respective internal
discourses can draw on each other's experiences and achievements. Second, cross-cultural
dialogue will enhance understanding of, and commitment to, the values and norms of
human dignity shared by all human cultures, thereby providing a common moral and
political foundation for international human rights standards.
/d.
64. /d. at 179. For example, the use of letter-writing or "urgent action" campaigns by
Amnesty International and other non-governmental organizations are often directed at
protecting the right to freedom of expression. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Act Now for
Human Rights, http://www.arnnesty.orglactnow/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (including appeals
to protect "human rights defenders").
65. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 179.
66. See An-Na'im, Problems, supra note 32, at 345. For instance, in his approach to
reconstructing the relationship between Islam and human rights, An-Na'im focuses on particular
examples, such as the treatment of women and non-believers. See id. In arguing for a
reinterpretation of existing Islamic law, he suggests incorporation of the principle ofreciprocity
as one way of reconciling the nondiscrimination principles of human rights with current
interpretations ofShari'a law. /d.
67. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 179-80.
68. See id. at 184; see also Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma:
Rethinking the Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 259, 291 (2004)
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Although An-Na'im employs the internal discourse
cross-cultural
dialogue construct to suggest means of reconciling international human rights
standards with Islamic law in particular national contexts, this theoretical
framework has broader application, as well. In this era of globalization, all
nations face a similar challenge--to a greater or lesser degree--of reconciling
international human rights standards with their existing national legal system,
which incorporates both the formal legal structure and the informal influence of
culture, religion, and custom. 69 Resistance to human rights standards generally,
or more commonly to particular rights, is rooted in this informal system of
norms and values. 70 Moreover, the resistance to international law at the
domestic level rarely centers on the content of the norm itself, but rather on the
interpretation and specific implementation of the norm in the particular
domestic situation.7 Appreciation of this strategic interplay of internal
("Formerly subjugated people's suspicions of human rights values emanating from colonial
powers must be viewed as part of the legacy of colonialism. The logic of these suspicions is
easy to discern, as people denied autonomy seek to establish cultural self-determination.
Misgivings about a human rights agenda originating from former colonizers is not
unreasonable.").
69. This expansive obligation is often reflected in general treaty language. See, e.g.,
ICCPR, supra note I 0, at art. 2; see also CEDAW, supra note 56, at art. 3 ("States Parties shall
take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of
women . . . .").
70. An-Na'im's definition of culture broadly includes religion and custom. An-Na'im,
Problems, supra note 32, at 335-36. He notes:
The prime feature underlying cultural legitimacy is the authority and reverence derived
from internal validity. A culturally legitimate norm or value is respected and observed by
the members of the particular culture, presumably because it is assumed to bring
satisfaction to those members. Because there may be conflicts and tensions between
various competing conceptions of individual and collective satisfaction, there is constant
change and adjustment of the norms or values in any culture which are accorded respect
and observance.
!d. at 336. Since this informal system of norms and values is particularly powerful in the
context of discrimination against women, the obligations ofparties to CEDAW are especially
broad. The CEDAW Resolution states:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.
CEDAW, supra note 56, at art. 5(a). The Resolution also states that CEDAW will "take all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women." !d. at art. 2(f).
71 . For example, few nations or activists currently would contest a general prohibition on
discrimination on the basis of race or gender. But many would contest the meaning of that
general prohibition in their particular domestic contexts. An-Na'im discusses the interpretation
of gender-based discrimination under Islamic law. See An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra

2006]

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

687

discourse and cross-cultural dialogue72 offers a simple methodology for
approaching the complexities of implementing human rights standards in the
wide variety of domestic contexts in today's global community and for ensuring
the cultural legitimacy-and ultimate effectiveness-of those standards.

II. A HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The role of the executive branch in international law is familiar: treatymaking, foreign policy development, and diplomacy. 73 The role of the
legislative branch is familiar, as well: providing advice and consent to treaties,
and adopting implementing legislation. 74 But less attention has been given to
the important role of domestic courts in implementing the nation's international
obligations, particularly its international human rights law obligations. 75
Domestic courts may directly apply international standards,76 but given the
general nature of the standards at the international level, domestic courts also
play a role by interpreting those standards in their domestic context. 77 The
note 12, at 181 . In the United States, there are ongoing debates about the appropriateness of
affirmative action programs. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268-71 (2003); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003). Note that Justice Ginsberg cites to international human
rights law in her concurrence in Grutter. ld. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
72. See An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 174 (stating that "the
combination of the processes of internal discourse and cross-cultural dialogue will, it is hoped,
deepen and broaden universal cultural consensus on the concept and normative content of
international human rights").
73. RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 303
(describing the President's role in authorizing or approving international agreements).
74. I d. (describing Congress's role in authorizing or approving international agreements).
75. See id. § 115 n.3 (explaining that "courts will give effect to international law 'where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,' and 'in the
absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in relation to the matter'"
(quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708 (1900)). The high courts of a few
nations have been the exception; for example, the post-apartheid South African Supreme Court
and the Canadian Supreme Court frequently cite to materials from other nations to support their
holdings. See Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT'L
L. 409,416-17 (2003) (providing a case study of the Supreme Court of Canada); Cody Moon,
Note, Comparative Constitutional Analysis: Should the United States Supreme Court Join the
Dialogue?, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 229, 232-39 (2003) (discussing the high courts of
Canada, South Africa and Australia). Additionally, other high courts have drawn notice for
high profile cases such as the British, Spanish and Chilean courts considering the Pinochet
prosecution. See Amnesty International, The Case of Augusto Pinochet: Timeline,
http://news.arnnesty.orglpages/pinochet_timeline (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (highlighting the
involvement of the United Kingdom and Chilean courts in the Pinochet case).
76. In United States courts, this happens when treaty provisions are self-executing or
when the court applies customary international law. RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF FoREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § Ill.
77. This is specifically accounted for in the doctrine of "margin of appreciation"
employed by the European Court of Human Rights and other international human rights bodies:
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Supreme Court has had opportunities to ensure the direct implementation of
international human rights standards domestically (and in turn, to play a role in
developing international jurisprudence on human rights), but the Court has
78
been cautious about doing so thus far.
Nevertheless, the Court has increasingly played another perhaps more
important role in advancing the cultural legitimacy of particular human rights
standards. In the Supreme Court, Congress, and the public life, the current
debates over the use of international law are truly about cultural legitimacy of
the international human rights standards, rather than domestic
implementation. 79 What generates the passion is not whether a particular treaty
or norm is self-executing, but whether the treaty or norm represents the values

Although the Commission and Court [now Court] invoke the principle of strict
interpretation and thus the favourable balancing of individual rights against state interests,
they in fact leave a certain amount of discretion for the states to decide whether a given
course of action is compatible with Convention requirements. This state discretion is
referred to as the "margin of appreciation."
DoNNA GoMIEN, DAVID HARRJS & LEO ZWAAK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 215 (Council of Europe
Publishing 1996). The doctrine reflects the view that "state authorities are in principle in a
better position than the international judge" to assess the balance of rights in particular domestic
contexts. Jd. (quoting Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976)).
Moreover, persuasive domestic jurisprudence finds its way back into the decisions of
international bodies. For example, the European Court of Human Rights provides a list of its
cases where it has drawn upon comparative law in its reasoning. See European Court ofHuman
Rights, Selective Comparative Law Case List, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHRIEN/Header/CaseLaw/Case-law+information/Selective+comparative+law+case+list/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
78. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720-21 (2004) (adopting a narrow
understanding of"the law of nations" in determining the scope of the Alien Tort Statute).
79. The Supreme Court has a mixed history regarding the protection of individual rights.
There are cases that pre-date the modem international human rights movement that still address
important human rights issues including discrimination. See generally Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 ( 1944) (analyzing the legality of a civilian exclusion order that curtailed
the rights of a particular ethnic group); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)(finding that a
statute that distinguished between races was constitutional); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130
(1872) (affirming the denial of a woman's law practice application); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393 (1856) (dismissing an action brought by a slave because he was not considered a
citizen). More recently, however, the Court has adopted a new mentality that progressively
defines and even extends individual rights protection. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (finding that abortion is within the scope of personal liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding that segregation was
unconstitutional). But within the Court, much debate remains regarding the issue of domestic
implementation and application of international law. For example, in another recent and
controversial Supreme Court decision, the issue was not cultural legitimacy, but rather the
complications of discerning and applying international human rights norms where there is
statutory authorization to do so under the Alien Tort Statute. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727-28. In that
case, the Court did not focus on whether "international" norms made sense and helped us
understand our own law, but on whether the norms could be directly applied. Jd.
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of the United States or the imposed values of outsiders. 80 The Court's
decisions in Atkins, Simmons, and Lawrence embody and advance this ongoing
internal discourse - cross-cultural dialogue process.
The United States Supreme Court's opinions address the criminal law
issues of the death penalty and the criminalization of particular sexual conduct,
but they also raise important constitutional and human rights questions about
individual liberty, privacy, and dignity. 81 Both areas implicate values
traditionally associated with the U.S. criminal justice system (deterrence,
punishment, retribution, rehabilitation, and accountability) and strong religious
and cultural values (vengeance, mercy, procreation, and the sanctity of intimate
relationships).
Internal discourse regarding the imposition of the death penalty is active
and enduring in the United States; 82 the treatment of same-sex relationships and
sexual conduct is also the subject of wide-ranging domestic debate. 8 The
80. A common criticism of the use of international and foreign legal sources in the
decisions has been that such use is "undemocratic," or anti-democratic. See e.g., Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's use of
foreign laws is "antithetical to considerations of federalism"). But see Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court
Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. I, 32,42-44 (2005) (arguing that the view of the Supreme Court as a
counter-majoritarian institution is flawed and examining the Court's decision in Lawrence v.
Texas as an example of the Court's majoritarian nature).
81. This process ofcultural legitimization also is demonstrated in other contexts, such as
the Court's consideration of the "death row phenomenon," and affirmative action. See Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,275 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,329 (2003); Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999).
82. There are numerous organizations that are active in opposition to the death penalty in
the United States. For example, Amnesty International lists over twenty organizations in the
United States.
Amnesty International, External Links:
Death Penalty,
http://web.arnnesty.orgllinks/bytheme?readform&restricttocategory=DEATH+PENALTY&coun
t=30 {last visited Jan. 12, 2007); see also Death Penalty Information Center,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (providing information on issues
concerning death penalty). Twelve states and the District of Columbia have no death penalty.
USA,
Abolish
the
Death
Penalty,
Amnesty
International
http://www.arnnestyusa.org/abolish/states/index.html {last visited Jan. 12, 2007). Other
organizations actively support the death penalty. ProDeathPenalty.com lists numerous
organizations that support the death penalty and provides links to supportive or neutral sites.
ProDeathPenalty.com, Death Penalty Links, http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/links2.htm (last
visited Jan. 12, 2007). The Prosecutor's Office in Clark County, Indiana, also has a website that
provides a statement supporting the death penalty and provides links to other pro-death penalty
sites.
Steven D. Stewart, A Message from the Prosecuting Attorney,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/deathldeath.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
83. There are also many organizations active on issues related to same-sex relationships.
The Human Rights Campaign is a prominent advocacy group that works for lesbian, gay,
bisexual and transgender equal rights. See Human Rights Campaign, Working for Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender Equal Rights, http://www.hrc.org/ {last visited Jan. 12, 2007). Others
are active in opposition. See, e.g., Focus on the Family ACTION, http://www.focusaction.org/
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Supreme Court's decisions in these areas reflect internal discourse and
ultimately contribute to it. The decisions have generated controversy largely
due to their content and outcomes, but also due in part to their explicit
references to foreign and international law in support of their outcomes. The
cross-cultural dialogue that appears in the decisions has been used as merely a
supplement, yet it has provoked public outcry. On the issue of the death
penalty, U.S. law and policy appears out-of-step with the worldwide trend
towards abolition;84 on the issue of privacy and liberty in intimate conduct, the
United States is arguably in the vanguard for protecting individual rights. 85

A. The "evolving standards ofdecency that mark the progress ofa
maturing society "86: Lessons from Atkins and Simmons about the Human
Right to Life.
From an international human rights law perspective, although the standards
regarding the death penalty continue to evolve, the standards are relatively wellestablished. There is a general consensus internationally that the death penalty
conflicts with the right to life and the right to security of the person; thus, the
death penalty should be abolished. 87 If exceptions are allowed, they are quite
(last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
84. According to Amnesty International, 128 countries have abolished the death penalty
by law or in practice. Of the remaining 69 countries, only a small number actually execute
prisoners, and the global trend is towards abolition. Amnesty International, Facts and Figures
ofthe Death Penalty, http://web.arnnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-facts-eng (last visited Jan. 12,
2007).
85. Several European countries provide some legal recognition of same-sex relationships
including: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain,
Germany, France, Luxembourg and Britain. Gay Marriage Around the Globe, BBC NEWS, Dec.
22, 2005, http://news. bbc.co. uk/ 1/hi/world/americas/4081999.stm. Other countries that provide
either marriage or similar recognition include Canada, Argentina, New Zealand, and South
Africa. !d. The Human Rights Campaign also lists Croatia, Hungary, Israel, Portugal, Slovenia,
and Switzerland as providing some legal recognition or benefits to same-sex couples. See
Human Rights Campaign, Marriage/Relationship Recognition Laws:
International,
http://hrc.org!femplate.cfrn?Section=Center&CONTENTID=26546&TEMPLATE=/TaggedPag
e/TaggedPageDisplay.cfrn&TPLID=70 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
86. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion), quoted in Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,561 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,311-12 (2002).
87. All major human rights treaties provide for the right to life, the right to security of the
person, and the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. See ICCPR, supra
note 10, at art. 6, 7, 9 ("Every human being has the inherent right to life.. . . No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ... Everyone
has the right to liberty and security of person."); African Charter, supra note 24, at art. 4, 5, 6
("Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person . .. .
All forms of ... cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited... .
Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person."); American
Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," art. 4, 5, 7, Apr. 8, 1970, 1144
U.N.T.S. 144, 145-46 [hereinafter ACHR] ("Every person has the right to have his life
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narrow and framed within a context of moving toward eventual abolition. 88
This is certainly true for the nations that the United States views as sharing its
history, traditions and values. 89 Moreover, most of the world favors abolishing
the death penalty.90 The international preference for abolishing the death
penalty is magnified when examining the specific contexts of execution of the
developmentally disabled or of juveniles.91 Although many international
respected. . . . No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment or treatment. ... Every person has the right to personal liberty and security.");
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, 3, 5, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 224, 226 [hereinafter European Convention] ("Everyone's right to life
shall be protected by law.... No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. ... Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.").
88. For example, after the general assertion in Article 6 that"[ e]very human being has the
inherent right to life," the ICCPR further provides:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of
the commission of the crime....
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the
sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all
cases.
6. Nothing in this [A]rticle shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital
punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.
ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 6. The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR is specifically
directed towards the abolition of the death penalty and provides, "Each State Party shall take all
necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction." Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1 (entered into force on
July 11, 1991).
89. For example, the European Convention sets out an explicit right to life in Article 2:
"Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime
for which this penalty is provided by law." European Convention, supra note 87, at art. 2. In
addition, the Convention has established a specific protocol regarding the death penalty. See
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, C.E.T.S. No. 114 (ratified by all
members ofthe Council of Europe except Russia).
90. See supra note 87. For an up-to-date report of which countries currently practice the
death penalty and which have abolished or abandoned it, see Amnesty International, Abolitionist
and Retentionist Countries, http://web.arnnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng (last
visited Jan. 12, 2007).
91. Several countries have recently raised the minimum age for the death penalty to 18
years old, including: Yemen, Zimbabwe, China and Pakistan. Amnesty International, Stop
Child Executions!, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-children-eng (last visited Jan. 12,
2007). Recent decisions by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have held that
the prohibition ofthe execution ofjuvenile offenders constitutes a jus cogens norm. Domingues
v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/02, mf 84-85 (2002), available
at www.cidh.org; Beazley v. United States, Case No. 12.412, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
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human rights norms appear to Jack consensus, either by treaty participation or
by state practice, the norms regarding the human rights violations inherent in
the death penalty are widely agreed upon. In fact, the United States is an
anomaly regarding its death penalty doctrine. 92
Nonetheless, internal discourse about the death penalty continues to occur,
particularly in the United States. 93 In fact, internal discourse is implicit in the
standards set forth in the Constitution; the Eight Amendment's prohibition of
"cruel and unusual" punishment94 suggests an ongoing evaluation of the
punishment against other standards to ensure that it is "graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense."95 In that evaluation, the Supreme Court
established a standard that considers "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society. " 96 Not only does the Court's standard
contain an inherently comparative function, but the Court also firmly grounds
its standard in "the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all
persons. " 97
98
Although the United States has not abolished the death penalty, the
99
Supreme Court has recently limited its scope: in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court
101/03, m!47-50 (2003), available at www.cidh.org. The ICCPR, Article 6, also provides,
"Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years
of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women." ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 6.
92. In the context of the juvenile death penalty, the Court in Simmons stated that "it is fair
to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the
juvenile death penalty." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,577 (2005). Although some may
suggest that the United States may ignore international human rights law because the country
already has a culture of compliance with individual rights, that argument is not available in this
context.
93. The Supreme Court is, of course, not the only participant in this discourse. See supra
note 82 (listing active organizations that advocate in favor of and against the death penalty).
The United States' resistance to international pressure to abolish or limit the death penalty may
reflect cultural values of independence and individual accountability, and cultural influences of
fear, violence, and racism. Nonetheless, domestic and international advocates of human rights
standards have been somewhat effective in changing the nation's views in this area, often by
using the method An-Na'im articulated, which reinterprets values embraced by and in the
United States to argue against the death penalty.
94. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. Vlll.
95. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 560 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910)).
96. /d. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 {1958) (plurality opinion)).
97. !d. at 560 ("By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth
Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.").
98. In 1972, the Supreme Court found that the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment when its imposition was left to the sole discretion ofjuries; consequently, all states
were required to rewrite their death penalty laws. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40
(1972). But in 1976, the Court allowed executions to resume in the United States. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
99. 536 u.s. 304, 321 (2002).
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prohibited the execution of the developmentally disabled, and in Roper v.
Simmons, 100 the Court prohibited the execution ofjuveniles. In both Atkins and
Simmons, the Court evaluated the historical debate about the death penalty in
the United States and, noting the evolution of public sentiment, reversed earlier
decisions. 101 The Court reviewed the "objective indicia of consensus" on the
death penalty by looking to the actions of the individual states, professional
associations, non-profit organizations, academia, and others with relevant
information or perspective in assessing the "evolving standards of decency." 102
The Court's reliance on international materials in the Atkins and Simmons
opinions created a greater controversy than the actual holdings themselves. 103
The Court looked beyond resources in the United States to the practices of
other nations, 104 as well as the various perspectives within the international
community. 105 In both Atkins and Simmons, the Court's analysis of the

u.s.

100. 543
551, 578 (2005).
I 01. !d. at 564-69; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-17.
102. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 563, 567. The majority of the states prohibited the juvenile
death penalty at the time of the decision in Simmons. !d. at 568; see also HOWARD N. SNYDER &
MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENlLE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 89, 133
(National Center for Juvenile Justice 1999). But see Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The
Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 148 (1997). The Court referred to numerous amici curiae in
both Atkins and Simmons. For example, in Atkins, amici included the American Psychological
Association, the United States Catholic Conference, and the European Union. Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 316-17 n.21. In Simmons, amici included the European Union, President James Earl Carter,
Jr., Former U.S. Diplomats, and the Human Rights Committee ofthe Bar ofEngland and Wales.
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 576.
103. The controversy also exists within the Court. Some Justices, notably Breyer, Kennedy
and Ginsburg, support the use of international and comparative materials. See supra note 4;
infra note 194. Other Justices are deeply opposed to the use of international and comparative
materials, notably Scalia and Thomas. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinions in
Lawrence v. Texas and Roper v. Simmons; Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court in
Atkins v. Virginia. Chief Justice Roberts has not yet had an occasion to address this issue in an
opinion. But in his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts responded to questions about
the use of intemationallaw in court decisions in the United States by stating: "I don't think it's
a good approach ... I'd accuse them of getting it wrong on that point, and I'd hope to sit down
with them and debate it and reason about it." Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 18, at
293 (statement of Judge John Roberts). He cited concerns arising under "democratic theory"
and concerns regarding the problems of selectivity and lack of restraints on judicial discretion.
!d. Justice Ali to expressed similar, yet stronger, views regarding the same. A lito Confirmation
Hearing, supra note 3; see infra Part II.C.
104. The Court's references to international views and practices did not begin in the
Simmons and Atkins opinions. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the Court
looked to the views of "other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the
leading members of the Western European community." !d. at 830.
105. There have been an increasing number of direct interventions by other States on this
issue. Most recently, other countries have used the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
to intervene in the cases of foreign death row inmates in the United States. See, e.g., Avena and
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"evolving standards of decency" 106 draws heavily upon the internal discourse
regarding the death penalty and selectively deploys cross-cultural dialogue to
increase the cultural legitimacy of the decision.
In Atkins, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the constitutionality of
the death penalty for the developmentally disabled. 107 In 1989, the Court had
examined this issue in Penry v. Lynaugh and concluded that the constitutional
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment did not preclude the execution of
those who are developmentally disabled. 108 But fourteen years later, the Court
reached the opposite conclusion inAtkins. 109 The main emphasis in Atkins was
the changing nature of the internal discourse regarding the execution of those
who are developmentally disabled. 110 The Court detailed the actions of state
legislatures to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for the
developmentally disabled in the years after its decision in Penry. 111 The Court
considered not only the number of states that had changed their laws, but also
the "consistency of the direction of change" to determine that a national
consensus had developed against the practice. 112 The Court's only reference to
a cross-cultural influence was in a footnote addressing the views ofthe "world
community." 113 But in the same note, the Court addressed the opinions of
domestic professional and religious organizations, as well as polling data
regarding the opinions of the American public. 114 The Court briefly noted that
"within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." 115
Given the majority's limited inclusion of cross-cultural perspectives in
Atkins, the depth in which the dissenting opinions addressed the matter is quite
surprising. In his dissent, then Chief Justice Rehnquist Goined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas), wrote separately to "call attention to the defects in the
Court's decision to place weight on foreign laws, the views of professional and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 20041.C.J. 128 (Mar. 2004) (finding the
United States in violation of its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations).
106. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 563; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
107. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
108. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
109. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
110. Seeid. at315-18.
Ill. !d. at 314-15. The Court noted that, in the intervening years, "the American public,
legislators, scholars, and judges" had deliberated over the question and "[t]he consensus
reflected in those deliberations" influenced the Court's conclusion. !d. at 307.
112. /d.at315.
113. /d.at316-17n.21.
114. !d. (citing the Brief for European Union as Amicus Curiae). The Court found
domestic support for its decision in a broad "social and professional consensus." !d. The Court
also found international support from the overwhelming disapproval ofthe ''world community"
for the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by the developmentally disabled.
!d.
115. !d.
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religious organizations, and opinion polls." 116 Rehnquist rejected any
comparative aspect to the evaluation ofthe "evolving standards of decency'': "I
fail to see, however, how the views of other countries regarding the punishment
of their citizens provide any support for the Court's ultimate determination....
For if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we are looking, then the
viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant. " 117 Justice Scalia, in his
dissent (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas), escalated the
rhetorical approach of the dissent in rejecting the views of the international
community: "[T]he Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate
'national consensus' must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote)
to the views of assorted professional and religious organizations, members of
the so-called 'world community,' and respondents to opinion polls." 118 Both
dissenting opinions sought to limit or qualify the sources the Court may
consider in evaluating the domestic internal discourse regarding the death
penalty. 119 Moreover, by focusing exclusively on a "national consensus" and
dismissing outside views "imposed" on Americans, the dissenting Justices
forcefully rejected the majority's consideration of cross-cultural dialogue. 120
In Simmons, the Court followed a path of analysis similar to the analysis in
Atkins in addressing the constitutionality of the death genalty for a juvenile
under age eighteen at the time the crime was committed. 21 Prior to the Court's
decision in Penry, which allowed the execution of the developmentally
disabled, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 122 the Court concluded that the execution of
juveniles over age fifteen, but under age eighteen, was not cruel and unusual
punishment. 123 In Simmons, the Court overruled Stanford. 124 As in Atkins, the
116. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
117. Jd. at 324-25. Rehnquist noted that earlier decisions in this area looked to
international opinions, but contended that the Court had since rejected this practice. !d. at 325.
118. Jd. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia continued:
Equally irrelevant are the practices of the "world community," whose notions ofjustice are
(thankfully) not always those of our people. "We must never forget that it is a Constitution
for the United States of America that we are expounding... . [W]here there is not first a
settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened
the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans
through the Constitution."
Jd. at 347-48 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
119. See id. at 322-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. Jd. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-56 (2005) (addressing whether it is
constitutionally permissible "to execute a juvenile offender who was older than 15 but younger
than 18 when he committed a capital crime").
122. Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
123. See id. at 380; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988)
(concluding that it would offend "standards of decency'' to execute any offender under the age
of sixteen at the time of the crime).
124. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574.
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Court began by evaluating the internal discourse regarding the execution of
juveniles. 125 The Court noted that at that time, thirty states prohibited
imposition of the death penalty onjuveniles 126 and that the trend oflegislative
action since its decision in Stanford had consistently moved closer towards
prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty onjuveniles. 127 The Court in
Simmons found this trend particularly striking in light of the "general popularity
of anticrime legislation," including a trend toward "cracking down" on juvenile
crime in other respects. 128 The Court in Simmons also considered the
underlying social purposes of the death penalty, which it identified as
retribution and deterrence, and concluded that neither purpose is advanced by
executing juveniles, given their "diminished culpability." 129 Essentially, the
Court in Simmons concluded that recognition of human dignity and special
consideration for vulnerable groups, such as juveniles, outweigh the values of
deterrence and retribution under today's standards of decency in the United
States. 130
The Court's conclusion about the standards of decency in the United States,
however, is strongly buttressed through cross-cultural dialogue:
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment
for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction
to the juvenile death penalty. This reality does not become controlling, for
the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.
Yet at least from the time of the Court's decision in Trop, the Court has
referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
"cruel and unusual punishments." 131

In the last section of the Simmons opinion, the Court discussed both the
relevant international law and the practices of other nations. 132 The Court cited

125. !d. at 560-68.
126. This includes 12 states that reject the death penalty completely. !d. at 564.
127. But the trend towards prohibition of the execution ofjuveniles has moved at a much
slower pace than the trend towards the prohibition of the execution of the developmentally
disabled. !d. at 565 (comparing Atkins, the Court noted the "[i]mpressive" rate ofprohibition of
the death penalty for the developmentally disabled).
128. !d. at 566.
129. !d. at 571 ("Once the diminished culpability ofjuveniles is recognized, it is evident
that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to
adults.").
130. See id. at 571-74. The Court concluded that"[w]hen a juvenile offender commits a
heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State
cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own
humanity." !d. at 573-74.
131. !d. at 575.
132. See id. at 575-78.
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various international human rights treaties: the Convention on the Rights ofthe
Child, 133 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 134 the
American Convention on Human Rights, 135 and the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child. 136 The Court also looked to the practices of
other nations and noted that since 1990, only seven other countries-Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
and China-have executed juveniles; each country has since either abolished or
publicly disavowed the execution ofjuveniles. 137 More specifically, the Court
in Simmons examined the United Kingdom's abolition "in light of the historic
ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment's own
origins," and noted that the United Kin~dom abolished the use of the death
penalty for juveniles over 50 years ago. 1 8
Perhaps anticipating the uproar that would result from the use of
international materials, the Court stated that the "opinion of the world
community" does not control the Court's decision, but rather provides
"respected and significant confirmation" for the Court's conclusions. 139 The
Court then linked American values with international human rights standards to
support its decision:
The [Constitution] sets forth, and rests upon, innovative principles original to
the American experience, such as federalism; a proven balance in political
133. /d. at 576; see Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. A/44/25, at 171, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989). Article 37(a) provides: "No child shall
be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither
capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for
offenses committed by persons below eighteen years of age." !d. at art. 37. The United States is
not a party to the Convention.
134. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 576; see ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 6(5). Article 6(5) states:
"Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years
of age ...." !d. The United States is a party to the Covenant, but has entered a specific
reservation that purports to exclude the U.S. practice of executing juveniles:
That the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose
capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such
punishment for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 22, Mar. 24, 1992, S. EXEC. Doc. No.
102-23 ( 1992). Interestingly, in Simmons, the petitioner argued that the ICCPR and the U.S.
reservation supported its case. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 567.
135. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 576; see ACHR, supra note 87. Article 4(5) provides, in part:
"Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was
committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age ...." !d.
136. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 576; see African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
art. 5(3), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). Article 5(3) provides: "Death sentence shall
not be pronounced for crimes committed by children." !d.
137. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 577.
138. /d. at 577-78.
139. !d. at 578.
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mechanisms through separation of powers; specific guarantees for the
accused in criminal cases; and broad provisions to secure individual freedom
and preserve human dignity. These doctrines and guarantees are central to
the American experience and remain essential to our present-day selfdefinition and national identity. Not the least of the reasons we honor the
Constitution, then, is because we know it to be our own. It does not lessen
our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that
the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own
heritage of freedom. 140

Although the dissenting opinions would have reached a different result,
they offered a somewhat parallel analysis. As in Atkins, Justice Scalia (joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) disagreed with the majority's
assessment of the internal discourse on the death penalty for juveniles and
rejected the use of cross-cultural dialogue to buttress that assessment. 141 Again
Scalia argued that the "evolving standards of decency'' test permits the majority
to impose its own views and values upon the nation. 142 But he also raised an
important point about the risk of selectivity in using international norms.
Although he conflated foreign law with international human rights law, Scalia
suggested that the members of the majority would reject the "reciprocity''
aspect of cross-cultural dialogue in areas where it does not reflect their
values. 143
Justice O'Connor, dissenting from the majority, wrote a separate opinion to
underscore her disagreement with the majority's assertion that a national
consensus has emerged in opposition to the death penalty for juveniles. 144
Nevertheless, O'Connor rejected Justice Scalia's contention "that foreign and

140. !d.
141. !d. at 607-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 607-08. Scalia stated:
The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation's moral standards-and in the
course of discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from the views
of foreign courts and legislatures. Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth
Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be
determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded
foreigners, I dissent.
!d. at 608.
143. !d. at 624-27 (discussing foreign laws on the exclusionary rule, establishment of
religion, and abortion). Scalia stated:
The Court should either profess its willingness to reconsider all these matters in light ofthe
views of foreigners, or else it should cease putting forth foreigners' views as part ofthe
reasoned basis of its decisions. To invoke alien law when it agrees with one's own
thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.
!d. at 627.
144. /d. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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international law have no place" in considering whether the punishment is cruel
and unusual under evolving standards of decency. 145 She stated:
[T]his Nation's evolving understanding ofhuman dignity certainly is neither
wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in
other countries. On the contrary, we should not be surprised to fmd
congruence between domestic and international values, especially where the
international community has reached clear agreement--expressed in
international law or in the domestic Jaws of individual countries- that a
particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights.
At least, the existence of an international consensus ofthis nature can serve
to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American
consensus. 146

Thus, the simple framework for advancing the cultural legitimacy of human
rights articulated by An-Na'im unfolded in the Supreme Court as follows: the
Court evaluated domestic practices in light of the practices of other nations and
examined international human rights standards to inform the understanding of
domestic constitutional law and standards, which resulted in rejection of the
juvenile death penalty.
B. "Liberty presumes an autonomy ofself that includes freedom of thought,
. if,, expresswn,
• and certam
• mtzmate
• .
beI ze
conduct n147 : L essons fr om
Lawrence about the Human Rights to Privacy and Freedom from
Discrimination.
From an international human rights law perspective, the norms regarding
homosexual conduct are not as clear as those addressing the death penalty. The
issue can be considered as a matter of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or as a matter of individual or family privacy. If the issue is framed
as a matter of nondiscrimination, it implicates a fundamental principle of
international human rights law. 148 Nondiscrimination is highlighted in
expansive terms in the International Bill of Rights instruments: the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. 149 Obligations of nondiscrimination are also included in the major
145. !d. ("Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to
foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency."
(citations omitted)).
146. !d. at 605.
147. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
148. The U.N. Charter includes nondiscrimination as fundamental principle of the United
Nations. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (noting that one purpose of the United Nations is to
promote and encourage "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion").
149. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "All human beings are born free
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regional human rights treaties. 15 Furthermore, two particular forms of
discrimination-racial discrimination and discrimination against women-are
the subjects of separate international conventions. 151 So far, there has been
only one specific treaty reference to nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation; 152 but much of the Reneral treaty language prohibits discrimination
on undefined "other" grounds. 3 Though the issue of discrimination based on
sexual orientation has received increasing international attention, the issue
remains a relatively new subject of discussion at the international level.

and equal in dignity and rights." UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 1. Article 2 provides:
"Everyone is entitled to the all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status." /d. at art. 2. The major human rights
Covenants include identical language. The ICESCR provides: "The States Parties to the
present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will
be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." ICESCR,
supra note 30, at art. 2. The ICCPR states, "Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory . . . the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind ...." ICCPR, supra note
10, at art. 2; see also U.N. Charter art. I (stating the purpose of"promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion").
150. See African Charter, supra note 24, at art. 2 (prohibiting distinction based on "race,
ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social
origin, fortune, birth or other status"); ACHR, supra note 86, at art. 1 (prohibiting
discrimination based on "race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition"); European Convention,
supra note 87, at art. 14 (prohibiting discrimination on "any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status"); see also The Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam, G.A. Res. 49/19-P, Annex, at art. l(a), U.N. Doc A/CONF.l57/PC/62/Add.18
(June 9, 1993) ("All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and
responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex ... or
other considerations.").
151 . See Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms oflntolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171 ,
U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (Nov. 25, 1981 ); CEDAW, supra note 56 (not ratified by the United States);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note
56 (ratified by the United States).
152. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states: "Any
discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited." Charter of
the Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 21, para. 1, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 13.
153. See supra notes 149-50 (prohibiting discrimination based on "other status" or "other
social condition").
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Alternatively, if the issue of sexual orientation is framed as a matter of
privacy rights, the situation is similar. There are numerous human rights
provisions addressing issues of personal privacy, particularly in the context of
intimate and familial relationships as well as other personal liberty interests. 154
But there is no explicit language pertaining to same-sex relationships. The
nations of Western Europe, whose values and history the United States views as
most similar to its own, offer more explicit protection to same-sex relationships,
either domestically or through the regional human rights mechanisms. 155 But
the privacy and liberty protection given to same-sex relationships remains a
controversy in many places around the world. 156
Domestically, of course, the internal discourse on same-sex relationships
and intimate conduct continues in the United States. 157 Interestingly, in
Lawrence v. Texas, 158 the Court appeared to follow the internal discourse 154. See ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 23 ("The right of men and women of marriageable
age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized."); ICESCR, supra note 30, at art. 10
("The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society .... "); European Convention, supra note 87, at
art. 8 ("Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except as in accordance with the law ...."); UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 16 ("[M]en and
women of full age . . . have the right to marry and to found a family.... Marriage shall be
entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.").
155. See supra note 85 (listing protections provided by Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Iceland, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Britain,
Canada, Argentina, New Zealand, South Africa, Croatia, Hungary, Israel, Portugal, Slovenia,
and Switzerland); see also Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 309
(finding that the decision of a Portuguese court denying custody to a parent on the basis of
sexual orientation discriminated against the applicant in violation of articles 8 and 14 of the
European Convention).
156. "[T]he concept of family in the minds of the drafters of the Covenant was the
traditional one of a man, a woman and, possibly, children. By introducing the concept ofsamesex couples, Denmark was eroding the original concept and violating the basic principal of
article l 0." Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Summary Record ofthe I 2th
Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 12th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.l2/l999/SR.l2 (May6, 1999)
(comments by Mr. Sadi). Canada's Parliament established a committee to research the issue;
the committee determined "that the definition of marriage as the voluntary union between one
man and one woman to the exclusion of all others was no longer acceptable under Canadian
law." Committee on the Rights of the Child, Summary Record ofthe 895th Meeting,, 61, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/SR.895 (Sept. 17, 2003) (statement ofMr. Farber of Canada). Same-sex couples
were already raising children and, therefore, "the legalization ofsame-sex unions would provide
such children with the same rights as those enjoyed by children from traditional marriages." /d.
157. The discourse regarding privacy interests and the prohibition ofdiscrimination against
same-sex relationships is at an earlier stage than the discourse concerning the death penalty.
Religion and culture play powerful roles as the debate takes shape. But even in this context.
human rights advocates are using values widely accepted in the United States, including
nondiscrimination and privacy, to argue for a human rights-oriented approach.
158. 539 u.s. 558 (2003).
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cross-cultural dialogue construct in its rationale more closely than it did in the
death penalty cases. As in Atkins and Simmons, the Court evaluated the history
of the debate, noted changing public views, and overruled a previous decision
to reach a human rights-based result. 159 Once again, the Court created
controversy by looking outside the United States to examine the practices of
other nations and the perspectives ofthe international community.160
The opinion in Lawrence began by re-characterizing the rights at stake. 161
In the 1986 case, Bowers v. Hardwick, 162 the Court upheld a Georgia statute
criminalizing certain same-sex intimate conduct, finding that the Constitution
does not confer "a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy." 163 Almost twenty years later in Lawrence, the Court invalidated a
similar Texas statute, framing the issue as a matter of private conduct in the
"exercise of ... liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. 164 After re-characterizing the rights at stake in this more generous
manner, the Court undertook a reinterpretation of the historical treatment of
sodomy it relied upon in Bowers.
The Court in Bowers had quashed any sense of internal discourse on the
issue by connecting the criminalization of sodomy to "ancient roots" and
presenting a picture of a long and unchanged historical condemnation of
consensual sodomy. 165 In Lawrence, the Court destabilized that notion by
carefully reexamining its history and reinterpreting sodomy prohibitions as
general condemnations of non-procreative sex, rather than as established
traditions of prosecuting homosexual conduct. 166 The general condemnation of
159. !d. at 578-79.
160. !d. at 572-73. "To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected
elsewhere." /d. at 576.
161. !d. at 562 (noting that the case "involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in
its more transcendent dimensions").
162. 478 u.s. 186 (1986).
163. !d. at 190, 196.
164. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. The Court characterized the liberty interest broadly as
"liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions." /d. at 562.
The Court explained:
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more
than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more farreaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior,
and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.
!d. at 567.
165. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94.
166. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570-74. The Court stated that it was only in the 1970s that
states began singling out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution. !d. at 570 (noting that
only nine states have criminalized same-sex relations). The Court also noted that some of those
states have since moved towards abolishing the prohibitions. !d.
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non-procreative sex has been the topic of much national debate; moreover, the
private, intimate conduct of individuals has been subject to increasing
protection by the Court for the past fifty years. 167
In Lawrence, the Court openly addressed the importance of the social
values at stake in this debate, particularly in the context of same-sex intimate
conduct:
The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right
and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many
persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions
accepted as ethical and moral princiEles to which they aspire and which thus
determine the course of their lives. 1 8

But the Court determined that recent laws and traditions are most relevant to
defining the accepted scope of liberty. 169 The Court found "an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 170 After
reviewing the current laws regarding intimate conduct, as in the death penalty
cases, the Court relied upon the trend by individual states either to repeal laws
criminalizing same-sex intimate conduct or to decline enforcement of those
laws. 171 The Court emphasized the powerful impact of such laws and their
resulting prosecutions on human dignity and the fundamental importance of the
liberty interests at stake. 172

167. The Court traced this history, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 4 79
( 1965) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the sale or use of contraception on grounds that the
law infringed upon the right to privacy in marriage), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(extending Griswold to unmarried persons), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the
right to an abortion is protected by liberty interests in Due Process Clause), and Carey v.
Population Services lnt'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a law prohibiting sale of
contraceptives to persons under 16 years of age). The Court also cited to more recent decisions,
including Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming
the constitutional protection of personal decisions regarding marriage, procreation,
contraception, and family relationships), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking
down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals).
168. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
169. Jd. at 571-72.
170. Jd. at 572.
171 . !d. at 573. The Court noted that the number of states with anti-sodomy laws dropped
from twenty-five at the time of its decision in Bowers to thirteen at the time of its decision in
Lawrence. In addition, only four of those states enforced their laws exclusively against
homosexual intimate conduct. I d. Even in states with sodomy laws, there was a pattern ofnonenforcement in cases involving consenting adults acting in private. I d.
172. I d. at 575-76. The court expressed concern about the consequences of such laws,
including public and private discrimination, stigma, risk of prosecution, and collateral
consequences of conviction. !d.
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Nevertheless, the Court in Lawrence did not limit itself to consideration of
the evolving national discourse. In its reevaluation of the historical and social
context, the Court also included cross-cultural perspectives. 173 It explained that
the British Parliament had considered repealing laws punishing homosexual
conduct as early as 1957 and took steps in that direction in the 1960s. 174 The
Court also mentioned the European Court ofHuman Rights' 1981 decision in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom 175 and subsequent case law following its
precedent. 176 In Dudgeon, the European Court found that the laws ofNorthem
Ireland prohibiting homosexual conduct violated the European Convention on
Human Rights. 177 Noting that this "integral part of human freedom" has been
recognized in many other countries, the Supreme Court concluded that it could
not find justification for giving it less protection in the United States. 178
The majority decision in Lawrence used the language of human rights and
human dignity, reframed the historical perspective to more fully reflect the
ongoing internal discourse, and cited to cross-cultural developments protecting
the interests at issue. 179 In this way, the Court has recognized and advanced the
cultural legitimacy of human rights norms protecting privacy and prohibiting
discrimination for same-sex relationships. Moreover, despite their different
outcomes, both the concurring and dissenting opinions also fit within this
methodological framework.
The concurrence by Justice O'Connor framed the issue in the case as a
matter of equal protection, rather than liberty and due process. 180 O'Connor
used the familiar language of the equal protection analysis to make an argument
that reflects fundamental principles of nondiscrimination: "I am confident,
173. The Court explained, "[w]hen our precedent has been thus weakened, criticism from
other sources is of greater significance." /d. at 576.
174. /d. at572-73.
175. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981).
176. The Supreme Court noted that the European Court of Human Rights continued to
follow its precedent in Dudgeon rather than giving consideration to the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Bowers. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
177. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. ~52 . The Supreme Court in Lawrence pointed out that
this decision is authoritative for all forty-five nations that are members of the Council of
Europe. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
178. !d. at 577.
179. The Lawrence opinion referenced numerous amici curiae, representing a wide range
of perspectives. Amici included the Cato Institute, the American Civil Liberties Union, and
Mary Robinson (former U.N. High Cornnlissioner for Human Rights). /d. at 568, 576-77.
180. Likewise, the majority briefly addressed the issue as a matter of equal protection. It
noted the connection between equal treatment and the due process right to "demand respect for
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty." /d. at 575. But the Court was
concerned that invalidation based on equal protection grounds would not go far enough and
would be vulnerable to more carefully crafted laws. /d. The majority also determined that equal
protection arguments would not address the important issues of stigma or dignity. /d. Further,
it stated that the continued existence of Bowers as precedent "demeans the lives ofhomosexual
persons." /d.
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however, that so long as the Equal Protection Clause requires a sodomy law to
apply equally to the private consensual conduct of homosexuals and
heterosexuals alike, such a law would not long stand in our democratic
society." 181 But O'Connor also noted that social values, such as national
security and preserving the traditional institution of marriage, might be
sufficient to overcome the value of equal treatment in other circumstances. 182
In his dissent, Justice Scalia emphasized a contrasting view of the internal
national discourse and a fierce reaction to cross-cultural dialogue using stronger
language than he used in the death penalty cases. He framed the issue squarely
as a "culture war," and he used this characterization to reject the Court's
involvement in advancing or determining that cultural evolution:
It is clear from this that the Court bas taken sides in the culture war, departing
from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of
engagement are observed. Many Americans do not want persons who openly
engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters
for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders in
their home. They view this as protecting themselves and their families from a
lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive. The Court views it
as "discrimination" which it is the function of our judgments to deter. So
imbued is the Court with the law profession's anti-anti-homosexual culture,
that it is seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously
"mainstream".... 183

Scalia also strongly rejected the cross-cultural perspective incorporated by
the majority opinion as "meaningless" but"[d]angerous dicta": "Constitutional
entitlements do not spring into existence because some States choose to lessen
or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior. Much less do they spring
into existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign nations
decriminalize conduct." 184
In Lawrence, the Court followed the conceptual internal discourse- crosscultural dialogue framework, but their analysis unfolded somewhat differently
than in the death penalty cases. The Court focused primarily on reinterpretin~
the domestic history and discourse on intimate conduct, as broadly defmed. 1
The court used the language of human rights and human dignity, and it drew
upon both the international human rights law developed by the European Court
181. /d. at 584-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
182. /d. at 585.
183. /d. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia later clarified:
Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other group, promoting
their agenda through normal democratic means. Social perceptions of sexual and other
morality change over time, and every group bas the right to persuade its fellow citizens that
its view of such matters is the best.
/d. at 603.
184. /d. at 598 (emphasis added).
185. /d. at 562-571 (majority opinion).
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ofHuman Rights and the domestic practice of the United Kingdom. 186 In this
way, the Court both recognized and advanced the cultural legitimacy ofhuman
rights norms protecting privacy and prohibiting discrimination. But because
the international human rights norms at stake are less explicit and more
contested both domestically and globally, the value of the cross-cultural
perspectives is more problematic. As a result, the cultural legitimacy of the
decision-and the human rights values it advances- is perhaps more tenuous.

C. Whose Law Will It Be? Looking Forward with the New Court.
Although the recent decisions in Atkins, Lawrence, and Simmons were
authored by sitting members of the Court, 187 the Supreme Court has undergone
a recent change in composition. With the retirement of Justice O'Connor and
the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the membership of the Court now
includes new Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. 188 The internal discourse
on the propriety of the Court's consideration of international human rights
standards was evident in both men's confirmation hearings. Former Judge
Roberts responded to questioning on the issue from Senator Coburn:
[Senator COBURN.] My question to you is, relying on foreign precedent and
selecting and choosing a foreign precedent to create a bias outside ofthe laws
of this country, is that good behavior?
Judge ROBERTS. Well, I ... don't think it's a good approach. I wouldn't
accuse judges or Justices who disagree with that, though, of violating their
oath. I'd accuse them of getting it wrong on that point, and I'd hope to sit
down with them and debate it and reason about it.
Senator COBURN. Can the American people count on you to not use foreign
precedent in your decision making on the Supreme Court?
Judge ROBERTS. You know, I will follow the Supreme Court' s precedents
consistent with the principles of stare decisis, and there are cases in this area,
186. /d. at 572-73.
187. Justice Stevens authored the 2002 opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305
(2002). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. Jd. Justice
Kennedy authored both the 2003 opinion in Lawrence v. Texas and the 2005 decision in Roper
v. Simmons and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in both decisions.
Roper v. ~immons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 561. Justice O'Connor
concurred in the result in Lawrence and dissented in Simmons; Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in both cases. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 554; Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 561.
188. The Senate confirmed John Roberts by a vote of78-22, and he was sworn in as Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court on September 29, 2005. Charlie Savage, Roberts Becomes
Nation's 17th ChiefJustice, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2005, at A 1, available at 2005 WLNR
15425224. After being confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 58-42, Samuel Alito Jr. was sworn
in on January 31 , 2006. Glenn Thrush, Amid Bitter Split, Senate Oks A/ito, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1,
2006, at A02, available at 2006 WLNR 1775822.
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of course. That's why we're having the debate. The Court has looked at
those. I think it's fair to say, in the prior opinions, those are not
determinative in the sense that the precedent turned entirely on foreign law,
so it's not a question of whether or not you'd be departing from these cases if
you decided not to use foreign law. 189

Roberts also had a lengthy exchange with Senator Kyl on the issue. 190
Senator Kyl specifically referred to Roper v. Simmons in his questioning. 19 1 A
few months later, then Judge Alito faced similar questions and he was even
more explicit in his response:
[Senator KYL.] What is the proper role, in your view, of foreign law in U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, and when. if ever, is citation to or reliance on these
foreign laws appropriate?
Judge ALITO. I don't think that foreign law is helpful in interpreting the
Constitution. Our Constitution does two basic things. It sets out the structure
of our Government and it protects fundamental rights. The structure of our
Government is unique to our country, and so I don't think that looking to
decisions of supreme courts of other countries or constitutional courts in other
countries is very helpful in deciding questions relating to the structure of our
government.
As for the protection of individual rights, I think that we should look to
our own Constitution and our own precedents.. ..
We have our own law, we have our own traditions, we have our own
precedents, and we should look to that in interpreting our Constitution.. . .
[Senator COBURN.] The question I have for you-and I could not get Judge
Roberts to answer it because of the conflict that might occur afterwards, but I
have the feeling that the vast majority of Americans do not think it is proper
for the Supreme Court to use foreign law. . . . I just wondered if you bad any
comments on that comment.
Judge ALITO. Well, I don't think that we should look to foreign law to
interpret our own Constitution.. .. I think the Framers would be stunned by
the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by taking a poll of the
countries of the world.. .. The Framers did not want Americans to have the
rights of people in France or the rights of people in Russia, or any of the other
countries on the continent of Europe at the time. They wanted them to have
the rights of Americans, and I think we should interpret our Constitution- we
should inte~ret our Constitution. I don't think it's appropriate to look to
foreign law. 92

189. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 18.
190. !d.
191 . Although Judge Roberts declined to comment on the specific case, he raised general
concerns about the use of "foreign law" as contrary to democratic theory and as improperly
expanding judicial discretion. !d.
192. A/ito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 3. Alito also commented on the issue in
response to questioning from Senators Leahy (affirming that English common law may help in
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Both nominees were firm in their renunciation of the use of"foreign" law
sources. This approach would accord with that of former Chief Justice
Rehnquist, but differ from that of former Justice O'Connor. 193 The other
members ofthe Court are split in their attitudes toward the use of international
law: Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer194 have referred
to international law and will likely continue to do so; Justices Scalia and
Thomas 195 have been adamantly opposed to such use and will likely continue to
be. Thus, one would expect that the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito will slightly shift the Court's willingness to consider, and certainly
to cite, international and foreign law sources.
But it is not just the addition of new members to the Court that may change
its willingness to consider international law and the practices of other nations.
The public interest, and often public outcry, on this issue is likely to have an
effect. 196 The prominent questioning of the nominees by members of Congress,
understanding United States law) and Kohl (clarifying that he does not think it is proper to look
to foreign law in interpreting the constitution, but that it may be helpful in looking to the
practices of foreign countries in how they organize their constitutional courts). Jd.
193. Chief Justice Rehnquist was explicit in his views in Atkins v. Virginia:
I write separately, however, to call attention to the defects in the Court's decision to place
weight on foreign laws, the views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion
polls in reaching its conclusion. The Court's suggestion that these sources are relevant to
the constitutional question finds little support in our precedents and, in my view, is
antithetical to considerations of federalism....
536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). In contrast, Justice
O'Connor wrote separately in Roper v. Simmons to affirm her view that it was appropriate for
the Court to consider foreign and international law: "I disagree with Justice Scalia's contention
that foreign and international law have no place in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Over
the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to foreign and
international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency." 543 U.S. 551,
604 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
194. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 554; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 561; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305;
see also Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could
Change the Supreme Court, THE NEw YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42 (describing Justice
Kennedy's "passion" for foreign and international law); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks
at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, "A Decent Respect to the
Opinions of [Human]kind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
2005),
available
at
Adjudication
(Apr.
1,
http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg05040 l.html ("lfU .S. experience and decisions can
be instructive to systems that have more recently instituted or invigorated judicial review for
constitutionality, so we can learn from others now engaged in measuring ordinary laws and
executive actions against charters securing basic rights.").
195. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 607 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (Scalia, J., and
Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Lane, supra note 4, at A 1 (accounting the debate between
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen G. Breyer at American University Washington
College of Law over the Supreme Court's use of foreign law in its own decisions).
196. In fact, the use of these cross-cultural sources has become a part of the broader

2006]

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

709

the proposed Congressional Resolution to prohibit the use of foreign sources by
the Court, and the public statements by members of the administration 197 all
suggest that the easiest course for the Court would be to refrain from further
invocation of international law, practice, or norms. That would seem to be the
politically wise choice, and given the supplementary part these sources have
played in the decisions themselves, a choice with little real cost. Yet, such a
conclusion ultimately reflects a misunderstanding of the importance of the
dynamic at work in this process. The Court has an important function in both
the internal, domestic discourse on human rights norms and in the ongoing
cross-cultural dialogue on those norms. It remains to be seen what roles Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will assume in that process, but it is unlikely
that the Court will abandon its responsibility to participate in and stimulate
dialogue completely.
CONCLUSION

The bounds and content of the relationship between the United States and
other nations in the international community always provide interesting, and
often provocative, questions. Equally provocative, at both the domestic and
international levels, is the role that "outsiders" should play in changing the
nature of a domestic legal or cultural system. The United States appears
increasingly willing to be that outsider by providing guidance or insisting on
the implementation of international legal obligations, including human rights
obligations, in the domestic systems of other nations. The United States has
been less willing to re-examine its own domestic laws and policies, viewing
cross-cultural or international input as that of outsiders who are imposing their
views on the nation; many in the nation believe that accepting outsider input
would offend national sovereignty and be inconsistent with domestic views and
values.
Does this resistance reflect the success of efforts to change international
human rights standards to be more reflective of other cultural perspectives? If
the controversial cases revolved around economic, social, and cultural rights,
the assertion may be persuasive. But the decisions on the death penalty and
sodomy laws involve basic civil and political rights, which have historically
been viewed as most compatible with U.S. notions of individual rights. Is the
rejection of international sources a reflection of a post-911 1 United States that
views any outside involvement as suspect? It is true that there may be a more
isolationist sentiment in the United States now, but the current debate about the
death penalty long preceded the events of 9/11, and the controversy around
same-sex relationships has no apparent connection to concerns about terrorism
and national security.

internal discourse on the substance of the human rights norms at issue in the cases. See sup ra
Part I.B.
197. See supra notes 4, 28 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps Professor An-Na'im's suggestions, which focus on the importance
of the domestic cultural (and religious) context at any given time, provide a
simple approach for examining a complex problem.
American
"exceptionalism" on this issue is not exceptional at all. The recent Supreme
Court decisions-Atkins, Simmons, and Lawrence-suggest that there may be a
growing openness to an internal re-examination on human rights protections in
the United States and to a cross-cultural dialogue on these issues. But the
outcry in response to the proposed use of human rights law suggests reasons to
remain cautious. The confirmation hearings ofboth new Justices have included
direct questioning on these decisions and the role of foreign and international
law in Supreme Court decisions.
From a normative and legal human rights perspective, the significant issue
is the development of cultural legitimacy, rather than purely formal
implementation. If limiting or abolishing the death penalty is viewed as
integral to a system of American justice and fundamental for the protection of
the right to life, then it will be accepted in the United States. If recognizing the
privacy of intimate relationships between persons of the same sex is considered
a logical extension of the existing protection for intimate relationships and a
commitment to equal treatment, then the political support will exist to ensure
that liberty. If the values reflect the culture of the United States and can serve
as both a model to and reflection of the values of the broader global
community, then the laws and the implementation of those laws, both domestic
and international, will follow.

